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RACIAL EQUALITY IN JURY SELECTION 
F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Chief Judge Robert Bell is so well known for his groundbreaking 
efforts in support of access to justice programs—whether through 
expanding lawyer assistance opportunities or creating problem-
solving courts—that his other significant legal accomplishments are 
often overlooked.  The quest for racial equality in jury selection is one 
aspect in which Chief Judge Bell’s contributions have made an 
important and long-lasting impression.  Chief Judge Bell has written 
eight precedent-setting opinions examining peremptory challenges 
and voir dire claims under federal and state law.1  His body of 
material goes from his powerful reasoning in Hill v. State,2 where, in 
response to the trial court’s refusal to include the defendant’s request 
for a racial bias question in the jury’s voir dire, he wrote that “[n]o 
surer way could be devised to bring the process of justice into 
disrepute,”3 to his principled dissent4 from a decision he viewed as 
erroneously applying the rule in Batson v. Kentucky,5 which governs 
how to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in 
jury selection. 
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 1.  The following cases involved peremptory challenges: Richardson v. State, 381 Md. 
348, 849 A.2d 487 (2004); Richardson v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 762 A.2d 48 (2000); 
Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 665 A.2d 223 (1995); Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 682 A.2d 
248 (1996); Mejia v. State, 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992); State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 
124, 596 A.2d 629 (1991).  The following cases involved voir dire: Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 
1, 595 A.2d 448 (1995); Hill v. State, 339 Md. 275, 661 A.2d 1164 (1995). 
 2.  339 Md. 275, 661 A.2d 1164 (1995). 
 3.  Id. at 284, 661 A.2d at 1169 (quoting Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 
(1931)). 
 4.  State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124, 132, 596 A.2d 629, 633 (1991). 
 5.  476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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II.  CHIEF JUDGE BELL’S JURISPRUDENCE ON RACE AND JURY SELECTION 
In Hill v. State, a black defendant was arrested by a white police 
officer for possession of cocaine.6  At trial, the defendant requested 
that the court include a racial bias question in the jury’s voir dire.  
The trial court refused, although it asked the usual questions about 
ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.  On appeal, the issue was 
whether the trial court correctly refused to voir dire the jury about 
racial bias.  The opinion, authored by Chief Judge Bell, found that a 
voir dire into racial bias is appropriate even if the case does not 
involve interracial violence.  In so finding, Chief Judge Bell explained 
the court’s reasoning: “We think that it would be far more injurious to 
permit it to be thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying 
prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed 
to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred.”7 
In Mejia v. State,8 a Hispanic defendant was charged with rape 
and related sexual offenses.  At trial, pursuant to the rule in Batson, 
the state used a peremptory challenge to exclude a jury member that 
the defendant alleged to be Hispanic.  The court overruled the 
defendant’s objection and trial proceeded, resulting in the 
defendant’s conviction.  The defendant appealed, alleging that when 
he objected to the peremptory challenge, he presented a prima facie 
case of purposeful discrimination to which the state was required to 
respond.  The Court of Special Appeals held that the defendant failed 
to present a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination and that 
“[a] proffer, even when neither contradicted nor challenged by the 
[state] or the court, [was] not sufficient.”9  On appeal, the issue was 
whether the defendant’s objection established a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination requiring a response by the state. 
The opinion, authored by Chief Judge Bell, noted that to prove 
purposeful discrimination the defendant must have shown that he was 
a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the state had 
exercised a peremptory challenge to remove a member of the 
defendant’s group.  The Court of Appeals determined that group 
membership could be assumed by observations and if the assumption 
goes unchallenged, the defendant need not offer additional evidence.  
The court ultimately concluded that the state did not respond to the 
defendant’s assertion and that the record demonstrated that there 
                                                        
 6.  Hill, 339 Md. at 277, 661 A.2d at 1165. 
 7.  Id. at 284, 661 A.2d at 1169. 
 8.  328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356 (1992). 
 9.  Id. at 532, 616 A.2d at 361. 
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was only one person of Hispanic background in the venire and that 
person was struck by the state.  On these facts, the Court of Appeals 
held that the defendant had established a prima facie case of 
discrimination, which required a response from the state.  In so 
holding, Chief Judge Bell explained the court’s reasoning: 
[W]hen the State uses peremptories in a manner that 
assures that no [members of a cognizable group] will serve 
on a jury that is to try a [member of that cognizable group], 
it is at least permissible to conclude that a prima facie case of 
discrimination has been made out.  In that circumstance, it 
is the effect of the use of the peremptories—exclusion of all 
Hispanics from the venire—not what was said or asked 
during voir dire, that is dispositive.10 
In State v. Gorman,11 the defendant was a black male who was 
charged with armed robbery and a handgun violation.  During voir 
dire, the state excluded two black jurors in the jury pool through 
peremptory challenges.  The two excluded black jurors were the only 
blacks in the jury pool.  The state argued that the challenges were 
discretionary ones falling outside of Batson’s coverage, and did not 
require explanation. 
After the defendant’s conviction and various appeals, the 
Supreme Court of the United States vacated the conviction and 
remanded the proceedings to the Court of Special Appeals on the 
issue of peremptory challenges applied to black venire members.12  
After several further appeals, the Court of Appeals held that the 
defendant could not challenge the use of peremptory challenges 
against black members of the venire.13  Upon further appeal, the 
Supreme Court again vacated the Court of Appeals decision and 
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.14 
On further consideration, the state conceded that the 
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges against the only two black 
venire members established a prima facie case of discrimination, and 
that the burden had shifted to the prosecution to demonstrate a race-
neutral reason for those challenges.15  On this appeal, the issue was 
whether the case should be remanded to the trial court so that the 
                                                        
 10.  Id. at 539, 616 A.2d at 355 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
 11.  324 Md. 124, 596 A.2d 629 (1991). 
 12.  Gorman v. Maryland, 480 U.S. 913 (1987). 
 13.  State v. Gorman, 315 Md. 402, 554 A.2d 1203 (1991). 
 14.  Gorman v. Maryland, 499 U.S. 971 (1991). 
 15.  State v. Gorman, 324 Md. 124, 596 A.2d 629 (1991). 
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prosecution could offer race-neutral reasons for exercising 
peremptory challenges, or whether a new trial should be granted.16 
The majority reasoned that, under Batson, this case should be 
remanded to the trial court to permit the prosecutor an opportunity 
to demonstrate race-neutral explanations for his peremptory 
challenges.17  Such remand could occur even though the prosecutor 
declined to provide such explanations during the trial and that six 
years had passed since jury selection concluded.  In the view of the 
majority, the remand was appropriate because a reasonable possibility 
existed that the prosecutor could reconstruct his reasoning from the 
original jury list and notes, and because the trial judge had the 
discretion to order a new trial if the prosecutor could not 
demonstrate a race-neutral motivation. 
In dissent, Chief Judge Bell concluded that the majority of the 
Court of Appeals erred in not ordering a new trial.18  Chief Judge Bell 
reasoned that remanding the case back to the trial court and 
affording the state an opportunity to supply race-neutral reasons for 
the peremptory challenges was problematic because the defendant’s 
counsel gave no indication as to the availability of his records or his 
ability to recall information that could challenge explanations that 
may be given by the state, and a remand would permit the great 
potential for abuse and an opportunity to construct false race-neutral 
justifications.  Explaining his reasoning, Chief Judge Bell stated: 
 In resolving this issue, the critical consideration is fairness, 
which at bottom is reflected in, and adds to, the integrity of 
the system.  When the State is not afforded an opportunity, 
at the trial level, to respond to defense charges, it would be 
unfair not to allow it to do so after an appellate processing 
has found those charges sufficient, prima facie, to require a 
response.  On the other hand, given the potential for abuse, 
the integrity of the process may be compromised when the 
State is given another opportunity to respond, 
notwithstanding its refusal to respond on the first occasion.  
That is especially the case when it is that initial refusal that 
caused the trial record deficiency on that critical point in 
the first place.  In my opinion, therefore, there is a need for 
a bright line minimum requirement, which, if it does not 
exist, will preclude a limited remand.  I would require, as a 
minimum, that the record of the proceedings reflect either 
that the State was not given the opportunity to respond to the 
                                                        
 16.  Id. at 129, 596 A.2d at 631. 
 17.  Id. at 132, 596 A.2d at 633. 
 18.  Id. at 138, 596 A.2d at 635. 
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defendant’s allegations or some indication that the State 
had an articulable basis for the strikes it made.19 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Chief Judge Bell’s writings on the subject of racial equality in jury 
selection depict a keen understanding of the need to protect 
individuals against racial discrimination, especially in the 
administration of justice; an awareness of the harm to those 
individuals and to society emanating from a failure to prevent such 
discrimination or the appearance of discrimination; and a sensitivity 
to principles of fairness and equity and how those principles have 
been skewed by historical racial imbalance.  While Chief Judge Bell’s 
personal experience at an early age with racism was, no doubt, a 
constant reminder of the need for careful examination of 
discrimination claims and the imposition of the strongest protections 
against such harmful treatment, his belief in enhancing justice by 
improving our laws could only have come from a deep sense of moral 
commitment to the rule of law and the highest regard for our 
constitutional democracy. 
One of Chief Judge Bell’s heroes, Baltimore-born Justice 
Thurgood Marshall, who represented a teenage Bell before the 
Supreme Court in 1960,20 was indeed smiling on those days when Bell 
made his pronouncements.  In Batson, the famous 1986 Supreme 
Court decision prohibiting the removal by peremptory challenge of 
all black persons from the venire without explanations, Justice 
Marshall worried in his concurring opinion that the remedy the 
majority was providing would be inadequate to prevent racial 
discrimination and the perception of bias in the administration of 
justice.  Justice Marshall explained: 
 I wholeheartedly concur in the Court’s conclusion that use 
of the peremptory challenge to remove blacks from juries, 
on the basis of their race, violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.  I would go further, however, in fashioning a remedy 
adequate to eliminate that discrimination.  Merely allowing 
defendants the opportunity to challenge the racially 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in individual 
cases will not end the illegitimate use of the peremptory 
challenge.21 
                                                        
 19.  Id. at 137–38, 596 A.2d at 635. 
 20.  CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE 
THURGOOD MARSHALL (1993). 
 21.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986). 
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 As the only Justice that had actually litigated a capital murder 
case,22 and as the most experienced litigator on the Court,23 Justice 
Marshall knew better than most other Justices the prosecutorial 
historical record.  Unfortunately, that record included the exclusion 
of blacks so that very few ended up actually serving as jurors. 
In his opinions in Hill and Mejia and his dissent in Gorman, Chief 
Judge Bell helped his hero Justice Marshall provide a “more adequate 
remedy” against racial discrimination in jury selection.  From a 
concern for preventing the appearance of bias in the administration 
of justice, as well as actual discrimination in such proceedings, 
through a meticulous protection of defendant’s rights against 
discrimination in jury selection through careful application of 
Batson’s peremptory challenge restrictions, to a keen understanding 
of the harmful realities of discrimination and the need to provide 
strong protections against it, Chief Judge Bell significantly improved 
racial justice in judicial proceedings.  For that contribution, all 
Americans owe Chief Judge Bell a debt of gratitude. 
                                                        
 22.  F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND QUESTIONS 593 
(3d ed. 2010). 
 23.  Id. 
